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King: Domestic Relations

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. MARMaGE

Loving v. Virginia,' while mainly presenting issues of constitutional importance, 2 is nevertheless the most significant of the
recent domestic relations cases surveyed. In June, 1958, two
residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro, and Richard
Loving, a Caucasian, were married in the District of Columbia
pursuant to its laws. On their return to Virginia, however, they
were convicted of violating that state's ban on interracial marriage." Subsequently, the Lovings sought to set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes in question were repugnant
to the fourteenth amendment's equal protection and due process
clauses. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia upheld the
constitutionality of the statutes, reasoning that marriage has
traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal
intervention, and that consequently, the regulation of marriage
should be left exclusively to state control under the tenth amendment.4 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although marriage is a social relation subject to the state's police power, it is
nonetheless subject to limitation under the fourteenth amendment;5 and, as such, the freedom to marry or not to marry a
person of another race resides with the individual and cannot
be infringed by the state. The Court also rejected the state's
argument that "because its miscegenation statutes punish equally
both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial
1. 87 S. Ct 1817 (1967).
2. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of this case, see Comment,
19 S.C.L. REv. 253 (1967).
3. The statutes under which the Lovings were convicted and sentenced were
part of a comprehensive statutory plan aimed at prohibiting and punishing
interracial marriages. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-58 (1950) provides:
Leaving State to evade law.-If any -white person and colored person
shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the
intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to
and reside in it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as
provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the same law
as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation
here as man and wife shall be evidence of their marriage.
VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-59 (1950) provides:

Punishmentfor narriage-Ifany white person intermarry with a colored
person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.
4. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
5. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ; Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon
race."0 Rather the Court found that "[t]he clear and central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all
official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
States" 7 and held that the statutes in issue rested solely upon
racial distinctions.
The Virginia statutes are similar to those of sixteen states,
including South Carolina,8 which prohibit interracial marriage.
The South Carolina Attorney General has stated in a press
release that the South Carolina statute will be left in the Code,
but will cease to be enforced.9

II.DivoRc
A. Proof of Adultery
In Odom v. Odom,"P the South Carolina Supreme Court, in
reversing the court of common pleas, held that a finding of
adultery in a divorce action was without evidentiary support.
Odom presents no novel questions, for it is well settled that
infidelity must be established by a clear preponderance of evidence and that proof of adultery must be sufficiently definite
to identify the time and place of the offense as well as the
circumstances under which it was committed."
B. Desertion
Iuabinet v. Ifnabjnet' involved an appeal from a divorce
action brought by the husband on grounds of desertion. The
trial court held that the wife's refusal to respond to her husband's offer of reconciliation constituted desertion, entitling the
husband to a divorce. The record in the instant case, as well as
the court's opinion in a prior action between the parties,' shows
that the Inabinets had occupied a room in the home of the husband's parents during marriage. Although the trial record is
relatively brief, it reveals that the parties' difficulties were
6. Loving v. Virginia, 87 S. Ct 1817, 1821 (1967).
7. Id. at 1823.
8. S.C. CoNsT. art. III, § 33; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7 (1962).
9. Columbia Record, June 13, 1967, § B at 1.
10. 248 S.C. 144, 149 S.E.2d 353 (1966).
11. E.g., Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 118 S.E.2d 171 (1961); Brown v. Brown,
215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.?d 330 (1949).
12. 249 S.C. 65, 152 S.E.2d 553 (1967).
13. Inabinet v. Inabinet, 236 S.C. 52, 113 S.E2d 66 (1960).
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further complicated by strife between the wife and her motherin-law. In November 1958 the wife separated from her husband.
Subsequently, the husband's mother died, leaving the home to
her son subject to a life estate in his father. The husband offered
testimony to the effect that he had a conversation with his wife
at his mother's funeral, offering her a chance to return to the
home if she desired.
The trial judge's ruling appeared to have been based on the
proposition that rejection of a sincere offer of reconciliation and
voluntary refusal to renew suspended cohabitation without justification constitutes desertion on the part of the party refusing
to resume cohabitation. 14 On appeal the supreme court qualified
this rule, holding that the offer of reconciliation must be a bona
fide and genuine appeal to correct marital discord.
The offer must be made with the desire and intention that
it be accepted and carried out in accordance with the performance of the duties of matrimonial cohabitation. The
offer must not be merely colorable or made merely to lay a
foundation for, or to defeat an action for, divorce. 5
The court opined that here the offer amounted to nothing more
than mere permission for the wife to return to an unhappy home,
there being no apology or excuse for the husband's shortcomings;
and the court noted that during the same period the husband was
still attempting to charge his wife with desertion. Thus Inabinet,
while recognizing the general law on desertion, lays down a
standard of reconciliation requiring a sincere and good faith effort to correct the difficulties leading to discord.

III.

ADoPToN

Galloway1 6

GaZloway v.
involved an appeal by Vera Jane
Lusher (Keenum) to set aside a decree of adoption. In 1955
after a divorce proceeding, Ben Galloway received custody of
Jeanette Galloway, his minor child. In April 1962 I. B. and
Maggie Galloway instituted an action to adopt the child, who
was their granddaughter. Answers to the complaint were filed
by the parties and by a guardian ad litem on behalf of Jeanette
14. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 225 S.C. 274, 82 S.E2d 119 (1954) ; Mincey v.
Mincey, 224 S.C. 520, 80 S.E2d 123 (1954); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 220 S.C. 437,
38 S.E2d 348 (1951).
15. Inabinet v. Inabinet, 249 S.C. 65, 69, 152 S.E.2d 553, 554-55 (1967),
quoting from 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 38(2) (e) (1961).

16. 249 S.C. 157, 153 S.E2d 326 (1967).
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Galloway. After a hearing which took place August 23, 1962,
a decree was issued declaring Jeanette Galloway the legally
adopted child of her grandparents. Approximately three and
one-half years later, Ben Galloway's former wife brought suit
to set aside the decree, alleging that the minor child had not been
served personally as required by Section 10-434 of the South
Carolina Code. 17 By way of an affirmative defense, the grandparents contended that no notice of the present action had been
given Jeanette Galloway or her guardian ad litem, and that no
appearance had been made on the child's behalf. The trial judge
found on the merits that the child had been properly served in
the adoption proceeding. The supreme court dismissed the
appeal which followed, but without reaching the merits of the
plaintiff's contention concerning failure of service on the minor.
Ironically, the court found that since neither the minor nor her
guardian ad Ziter had been served in the present action, one of
the parties in interest was not properly before the court and
that party's rights could not be adjudicated. Certainly paramount in the judgment of the court was the settled rule that the
welfare of the child is controlling in all proceedings of adoption. 18 It was with this in mind that the court refused to divest
the child of her rights under the adoption decree without notice
and representation. The court's refusal to pass on the adoption
procedure is in line with the principle that the rights of minors
have precedence over procedural rules. 19
IV. Donens
20

Bowman v. DuBose, the only federal district court case of
significance in the surveyed area, involved a motion to dismiss
a tort action for lack of jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction
frequently arises in domestic relations cases, and while the case
at hand involves a tort action, this decision is equally applicable
to jurisdictional disputes originating from domestic relations
actions. The defendant contended that the plaintiff's domicile
17. In Clark v. Neves, 76 S.C. 484, 490, 57 S.E. 614, 616 (1907) the court

said: "When it appears affirmatively on the face of the record that an infant
has not been served with summons, the infant is not bound by the proceedings."

Quoted wuith approval in Fouche v. Royal Indem. Co., 217 S.C. 147, 154, 60
S.E.2d 73, 75 (1950).
18. 2 AM. Jua. 2d Adoption § 82 (1962).
19. See, e.g., Caughman v. Caughman, 247 S.C. 104, 146 S.E.2d 93 (1965);
Jackson v. Walters, 246 S.C. 486, 144 S.E2d 422 (1965); Cumbie v. Cumbie,

245 S.C. 107, 139 S.E.2d 477 (1964).
20. 267 F. Supp. 312 (D.S.C. 1967).
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was South Carolina, not West Virginia as alleged, thus the federal court was without diversity jurisdiction. In 1942 the plaintiff, while domiciled in West Virginia, enlisted in the United
States Army. From that date forward he was a member of the
Armed Services, with his final station at Shaw Air Force Base,
South Carolina, where he remained until his retirement, April
30, 1966. In denying the defendant's motion, the district court
found that the defendants failed to prove a manifestation of
intention on the part of the plaintiff to establish a new domicile
on moving to South Carolina.
The word domicile may be defined as "the place with which
a person has a settled connection for certain legal purposes,
either because his home is there, or because that place is assigned
to him by the law."2 1 It is well settled that a serviceman, who is
often in transit, retains his domicile as of the date of enlistment
unless he indicates an intention to abandon it in favor of a new
one. 22 The burden of proving such an intention on the part of
military personnel can only be met by clear and unequivocal
evidence. 23 Evidence that the plaintiff purchased a home near
Shaw Field,2 4 that he sought employment in the Sumter area
after retirement, that he had an automobile registered with the
South Carolina Highway Department 25 and had procured a
South Carolina driver's license, 2 6 and that he had remained in
South Carolina after retirement was held insufficient to prove
domiciliary change.
The instant case reinforces the settled rule that domicile is
primarily a matter of the individual's intent to be determined
from the facts and circumstances of each case.27' Moreover, this
decision illustrates the court's hesitance to infer requisite intent
from such specific acts as those related above.
H. Sr NcER KnG
RESTATEMENT OF CoNsTicT LAWS § 9 (1934).
22. Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Finger v. Master-

21.

son, 152 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.S.C. 1957); 1954-1955 Op. S.C. ATT'Y GEN. 278
(1955); 1945-1946 Op. S.C. Arr'Y GEN. 201 (1945).
23. E.g., Sweeney v. District of Columbia, 113 F2d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Kinsel v. Pickens, 25 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Tem. 1938); Ex parte White 228
F. 88 (D.N.H. 1915).
24. Compare Humphrey v. Fort Knox Transit Co., 58 F. Supp. 362 (W.D.
Ky 1945), aff'd per curiam, 151 F.2d 602 (6th Cir. 1945) and Yinsel v. Pick-

ens, 25 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Tex. 1938) with Deese v. Hundley, 232 F. Supp.
848 (W.D.S.C. 1964).
25. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-102 (1962).
26. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-152, -153(2) (1962).
27. E.g., Deese v. Hundley, 232 F. Supp. 848 (W.D.S.C. 1964); Gasque v.
Gasque, 246 S.C. 423, 143 S.E.2d 811 (1965).
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